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Abstract
We introduce and characterize a new class of bargaining solutions:
those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary re-
lations to eliminate alternatives. As a by-product we obtain as a par-
ticular case a partial characterization result by Zhou (Econometrica,
1997) of an extension of the Nash axioms and solution to domains in-
cluding non-convex problems, as well as a complete characterizations
of solutions that satisfy Pareto optimality, Covariance with positive
aﬃne transformations, and Independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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11 Introduction
Imagine an arbitrator who can rank alternatives on the basis of a fairness
criterion. He chooses an alternative from the feasible set by means of the
following procedure. First, he discards all alternatives which are Pareto
dominated. Then, among the remaining ones, he picks the fairest alterna-
tive. In this paper we introduce and characterize a new class of bargaining
solutions that generalizes (to arbitrary criteria) this intuitive two-stage proce-
dure. A two-stage bargaining solution is a solution which can be constructed
by sequentially applying two asymmetric binary relations P1 and P2.M o r e
precisely, the solution point from each feasible set is the (single-valued) set
that P2−dominates all the P1−maximizers.
There are several features of interest in our concept and characterizations.
First, the sequential procedure by which we model the arbitrator’s decisions
is natural. Indeed, Tadenuma [9] has considered the sequential application
of exactly the two above criteria, eﬃciency and fairness, in social choice1.
Our contribution generalizes and abstracts this idea within an axiomatic
bargaining framewok a la Nash ([6])2. We provide a complete characterization
of two-stage bargaining solutions.
Second, even when the two criteria are well-behaved in the sense of being
transitive, they can generate solutions which violate the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom. For example, suppose that c is fairer
than a which is fairer than b, and that the only possible Pareto comparison is
that b Pareto dominates c. Then the arbitrator chooses a from {a,b,c} (ﬁrst
1Tadenuma studies in particular the eﬀect of the order of application of the two criteria
2See Thomson [10] for an overview of axiomatic bargaining theory.
2discarding c by Pareto dominance and then b by fairness), but he chooses c
from {a,c} (by applying fairness). Contrast this with the maximization of
a single relation: on a standard domain a bargaining solution maximizes a
binary relation if and only if it satisﬁes IIA (Peters and Wakker [8]), and on
many domains including non-convex problems the relation must be transitive
when the solution also satisﬁes Pareto optimality (Denicoló and Mariotti [2]).
Third, we consider solutions on domains that include non-convex prob-
lems. In this respect our paper is related to a number of papers on the ex-
tension of bargaining solutions satisfying the original Nash axioms (discussed
below) on larger domains. Our framework delivers a major by-product by
yielding a generalization of a theorem of Zhou [11], which states that any
solution that satisﬁes IIA, Pareto optimality (PAR) and Covariance with
positive aﬃne transformations (COV) is a selection from some asymmetric
Nash multivalued solution3. We show that any solution that satisﬁes a certain
weakening of IIA (discussed below), in addition to PAR and COV, sequen-
tially maximizes two relations that are invariant with aﬃne transformations
(that is xPiy if and only if τ (x)Piτ (y) for any positive aﬃne transformation
τ). If the solution satisﬁes IIA in full, then the two relations collapse into a
single transitive relation: this provides a complete characterization of PAR,
COV and IIA bargaining solutions. Zhou’s partial characterization result
then follows easily.
The weakening of IIA is achieved through two consistency axioms that,
together with PAR, characterize two-stage bargaining solutions. The ﬁrst
3Zhou’s theorem is also obtained with diﬀerent techniques by Denicolo and Mariotti
[2] and in a recent paper by Peters and Vermeulen [7].
3is Expansion (EXP): if x is the solution point of each problem in a class of
bargaining problems then it is the solution of their union. The second axiom
is Weak IIA (WIIA): if x is the solution point of two nested bargaining
problems R and T w h i c hb o t hc o n t a i ny,t h e ny is not the solution point of
any ‘intermediate’ problem S. WIIA allows some ‘menu eﬀects’ excluded by
I I A .E X Pa n dW I I Aa r eb o t hi m p l i e db yI I Aw h i l et h ec o n v e r s ei sn o tt r u e
(as the Pareto/fairness example in the opening paragraph illustrates).
2 Preliminaries
A( bargaining) problem is a pair (S,d),w h e r eS ⊂ Rn and d ∈ S.T h es e t
S is interpreted as the set of feasible alternatives (welfare or utility vectors
for n agents) from which an arbitrator must choose, and d is a distinguished
point relevant for the arbitrator’s decision. Following usage, we call d the
disagreement point.
Rn is viewed as a vector space, with the origin and the unit vector denoted
0 and e, respectively. The vector inequalities are: s>tiﬀ si >t i for all i;
s ≥ t iﬀ si ≥ ti for all i.A p o s i t i v e a ﬃne transformation is a function τ :
Rn → Rn such that, for some real numbers αi > 0 and βi, i =1 ,...,n, τi (s)=
αisi +βi for all i.G i v e nS ⊂ Rn and and a positive aﬃne transformation τ,
denote τ (S)={t ∈ Rn|t = τ (s) for some s ∈ S}. For a bargaining problem
(S,d),d e n o t eτ (S,d)=( τ (S),τ(d)).
Given a domain of bargaining problems Σ,asolution on Σ is a function
γ : Σ → Rn such that γ (S,d) ∈ S for all (S,d) ∈ Σ. Sometimes we will refer
to multi-solutions,f o rw h i c hγ is allowed to be a correspondence.
4We consider a very general class of domains of bargaining problems4.
Say that a domain Σ of bargaining problems is admissible if the following
assumptions hold:
D1: For all (S,d) ∈ Σ: S is compact and there exists s ∈ S such that
s>d .
D2: For all d ∈ Rn, for all s,t ∈ {u ∈ Rn|u>d }, there exists a unique
(M (s,t),d) ∈ Σ such that: (a) s,t ∈ M (s,t) and for all u ∈ S with u 6= s,t,
s ≥ u,o rt ≥ u, or both. (b) for any (S,d) ∈ Σ with s,t ∈ S, M (s,t) ⊆ S.









All domains of non-convex problems considered in the literature are par-
ticular cases of admissible domains. For example the set of comprehensive
problems (Zhou [11], Peters and Vermeulen [7]), the set of ﬁnite problems
(Mariotti [4], Peters and Vermeulen [7]), the set of all problems satisfying
D1 (Kaneko [3]), the set of d-star shaped problems5. While D1 is standard
and D3 straightforward, D2 deserves a special note. Its role in the analysis is
to guarantee the existence of a ‘minimal’ problem containing any two given
alternatives, and such that the solution point is (under PAR) one of those
two alternatives.
From now on, unless speciﬁed otherwise, ﬁx an admissible domain Σ.W e
consider the following axioms on solutions, intended for all (S,d),(R,d) ∈ Σ:
COV: For any positive aﬃne transformation τ, γ (τ (S,d)) = τ (γ (S,d)).
PAR: For all s ∈ Rn with s ≥ γ (S,d) and s 6= γ (S,d): s/ ∈ S.
IIA:I fγ (S,d) ∈ R ⊂ S,t h e nγ (R,d)=γ (S,d).
4This class was was essentially introduced in Denicolo and Mariotti [2].
5That is, those problems (S,d) for which the convex hull of {d,s} is in S for all s ∈ S.

















WIIA: If γ (R,d)=γ (T,d)=s and t ∈ R ⊂ S ⊂ T,t h e nγ (S,d) 6= t.
The ﬁrst theree axioms are standard in bargaining theory. EXP is stan-
dard in choice theory. Only the last axiom is relatively new6.I t c a n b e
interpreted as follows. Start with IIA: one way of reading it is that if new
alternatives are added to the problem, then either the solution point is un-
changed, or the new solution point is one the the new alternatives. In other
words, there are no ‘menu-eﬀects’: the eﬀect of a new alternative cannot be
to change the solution point to one of the ‘old’ alternatives. By contrast,
W I I Aa l l o w sf o rs o m es u c hm e n ue ﬀects. However, suppose that adding a
l a r g es e to fn e wa l t e r n a t i v e sd o e sn o tp r o d u c ea n ye ﬀect. Then adding a
smaller set of new alternatives does not make an old alternative a solution
point.
3 Two-stage bargaining solutions
As standard, we consider only solutions that satisfy translation-invariance (as
most known solutions do)7. This permits to simplify notation by normalising
the disagreement point of all problems to the origin. A bargaining problem
c a nt h e nb ed e ﬁned simply as a subset of Rn containing the origin, and a
bargaining solution can be denoted accordingly. The main new deﬁnition
of this paper is the following (where max(S,P) denotes the set of maximal
6This axiom was suggested by Michele Lombardi.
7In obvious notation, translation invariance means γ (S + t,d + t)=γ (S,d)+t for all
t ∈ Rn.
6elements of the relation P in the set S).
Deﬁnition 1 A solution γ is a two-stage solution if there exist two asym-
metric relations P1 and P2 on Rn
++ such that, for all S ∈ Σ,
{γ (S)} = {s ∈ max(S,P1)|sP2t for all t ∈ max(S,P1), t 6= s}
In this case we say that P1 and P2 rationalize γ.I fP1 and P2 can be chosen
so that P1 = P2 = P we say that the solution is a degenerate two-stage
solution, rationalized by P.
We have discussed the idea behind this deﬁnition in the introduction, so
we shall not repeat it here.
Example 1 (Nash solutions): The symmetric Nash bargaining multi-
solution ν is deﬁned by the correspondence which associates with each prob-
lem the maximizers of the symmetric Nash product, namely






for all S ∈ Σ. A symmetric Nash selection is a solution that coincides with
a selection from ν.8 Some symmetric Nash selections (e.g. those satisfying




i ti and the relation P2 is used to break the ties between Nash
product maximizers within each set. For a speciﬁc case, consider n =2and
sP2t iﬀ s1 >t 1. However this is a degenerate two-stage solution, as by taking
the union of P1 and P2 one can rationalize the solution in one stage.
8Note that the adjective ‘symmetric’ refers to the objective function to be maximized,
obviously not to the selection itself, which on the usual domains will not be symmetric.
7Example 2 (ﬁrst eﬃciency, then equality):l e tsP1t iﬀ s ≥ t and




















and a suitable tie-breaking rule, left undeﬁned here, is met. The resulting
two-stage solution picks the alternative that maximizes a measure of equality
over the set of strongly Pareto optimal alternatives. As we have seen in
the introduction, this procedure can generate cycles. Together with this
observation, our theorem 3 below shows that this two-stage solution is not
degenerate.
Example 3 (ﬁrst goodness, then eﬃciency): ﬁxas e tG ⊂ Rn
+
of ‘good’ alternatives. Let sP1t iﬀ s ∈ G and t ∈ Rn\G.L e t sP2t iﬀ
s1 >t 1 or s1 = t1 and s2 >t 2 etcetera. The resulting two-stage solution ﬁrst
eliminates all alternatives which are not ‘good’, provided there are some good
alternatives which are feasible, and then it lexicographically maximizes the
welfare of the agents. If there are no good alternatives, one moves directly
to the lexicographic maximization stage. As a speciﬁce x a m p l e ,l e tG =
©
s ∈ Rn
+|s = λe for some scalar λ>0
ª
.I nt h i sc a s eg o o d n e s si se q u a l i t y :i f
the feasible set intersects the 450 line, the solution is egalitarian (and whether
it is Pareto optimal or not depends, of course, on the domain). If equality is
not achievable a speciﬁcf o r mo fe ﬃciency is sought.
The main result of this section is a complete characterization of two-stage
solutions. Say that a relation P on Rn is Pareto consistent if it contains the
strong Pareto relation:
8Theorem 2 A solution is a two-stage solution, which can be rationalized by
Pareto consistent P1and P2, if and only if it satisﬁes PAR, EXP and WIIA.
Proof: Suﬃciency. Let γ be a solution that satisﬁes the axioms. Note
ﬁr s tt h a tb yD 2a n dP A R ,g i v e ns,t ∈ Rn there exist a minimal (in the
order of set inclusion) problem M (s,t) ∈ Σ with the property that either
γ (M (s,t)) = s or γ (M (s,t)) = t.
Now we explictly construct the relations P1 and P2.D e ﬁne sP1t iﬀ there is
no S ∈ Σ such that t = γ (S) and s ∈ S.D e ﬁne sP2t iﬀ s = γ (M (s,t)).T h e
relation P1 is asymmetric since sP1t and tP1s c o u l db eb o t ht r u eo n l yi fb o t h
s 6= γ (S) for all S ∈ Σ with t ∈ S and t 6= γ (S) for all S ∈ Σ with s ∈ S:
But, as observed, γ (M (s,t)) ∈ {s,t}.T h ea s y m m e t r y o fP2 is guaranteed
b yt h es i n g l ev a l u e d n e s so fγ.T h a tP1 and P2 are Pareto consistent follows
immediately from PAR.
For any S ∈ Σ, obviously there exists no s ∈ S for which sP1γ (S).T a k e
any s ∈ S for which sP2γ (S): we show that then s is eliminated in the ﬁrst
round. Suppose to the contrary that there is no t ∈ S with tP1s.T h e r e f o r e ,
by the deﬁnition of P1, for all t ∈ S\s there exists Tt ∈ Σ such that t ∈ Tt
and s = γ (Tt).B yD 3 ,
S
t Tt ∈ Σ.B yE X P ,s = γ (
S
t Tt).S i n c esP2γ (S),
s = γ (M (s,γ (S))).S i n c e w e h a v e M (s,γ (S)) ⊆ S ⊂
S
t Tt ∈ Σ,W I I A
is contradicted. We can conclude that there exists t ∈ S such that tP1s.
Observe ﬁnally that γ (S)P2s for any s ∈ max(S,P1): in fact, by D2 and
PAR, P2 is a complete relation, and by the previous argument it cannot be
s = γ (M (s,γ (S))) for any s ∈ max(S,P1).
Necessity. Let γ be a two-stage solution that satisﬁes PAR, rationalized
by P1 and P2.L e t
©
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k Sk ∈ Σ.T h e ntP1s for no t ∈
S



















), and EXP is satisﬁed. Next,
suppose that s = γ (R)=γ (T) with t ∈ R ⊂ T. Suppose by contradiction
that t = γ (S) for some S ∈ Σ with R ⊂ S ⊂ T.S i n c et = γ (S) there cannot
exist u ∈ R ⊂ S for which uP1t.T h e nsP2t (as s = γ (R)), and there exists
u ∈ S such that uP1s. But this contradicts s = γ (T).Q E D
The result that follows makes precise the diﬀerence betwen the combina-
tion of WIIA and EXP on the one hand, and IIA on the other.
Theorem 3 A solution is a degenerate two-stage solution, which can be ra-
tionalized by a complete9, asymmetric, transitive and Pareto consistent rela-
tion P, if and only if it satisﬁes PAR and IIA.
Proof:L e tγ be a solution that satisﬁes the axioms. Since IIA is easily
seen to imply WIIA and EXP, asymmetric relations P1 and P2 can be con-
structed as in the proof of the previous theorem. Note that for any s,t > 0,
if sP1t then (by D2 and PAR) s = γ (M (s,t)) so that sP2t.A n du s i n gI I A
and the deﬁnition of M (s,t),i fsP2t then sP1t: otherwise, t = γ (T) for
some T ∈ Σ with s ∈ T would imply t = γ (M (s,t)),t h a ti stP2s. Therefore
P1 = P2 = P.
To see that P is transitive, suppose that sPtPu. This means (viewing P
as P2)t h a ts = γ (M (s,t)) and t = γ (M (t,u)). Suppose by contradiction
that it is not the case that sPu,s ot h a tu = γ (M (s,u)).L e tT = M (s,t)∪
M (t,u) ∪ M (s,u).B y D 3 ,T ∈ Σ.B y P A R ,γ (T) ∈ {s,t,u},s ot h a tI I A
applied to T and one of the sets M (s,t), M (t,u) or M (s,u) is contradicted.
9By complete we mean here that either sPt or tPs for any distinct s and t.
10P is clearly complete and Pareto consistent by D2 and PAR. To conclude,
it is easy to show that a solution that can be rationalized as in the statement
satisﬁes the axioms. QED
We can see, then, that weakening IIA to the combination of WIIA and
EXP has two distinct eﬀects: ﬁrst, it permits solutions that are rationalized
by two relations rather than a single one. Second, it permits to relax the
transitivity of the rationalizing relations.
















,t h e nγ (S,d) 6= t.
By using arguments essentially identical to those in the proof of theorem
2, one can obtain an extension of that theorem:to even more general domains:
Theorem 4 Consider a domain Σ that satisﬁes D1 and D2. A solution on Σ
is a two-stage solution, which can be rationalized by Pareto consistent P1and
P2, if and only if it satisﬁes PAR, and WIIA*.
4C o v a r i a n t s o l u t i o n s
In this section we consider solutions that satisfy COV. To this end, we need to
make two further domain assumptions (formulated for normalized problems:
D4:F o ra l lS ∈ Σ, for all positive aﬃne transformation τ: τ (S) ∈ Σ.
D5:F o ra l ls,t ∈ Rn
++, for all positive aﬃne transformation τ: τ (M (s,t)) =
M (τ (s),τ(t))
11As before, ﬁx an admissible domain Σ, which satisﬁes in addition D4 and
D5. A relation P on Rn
++ is invariant with positive aﬃne transformations (or
pat-invariant in short) iﬀ, for all positive aﬃne transformations τ, τ (s)Pτ(t)
whenever xPt.
We can now provide a characterization of two-stage and degenerate two-
stage COV solutions:
Theorem 5 (i) A solution is a two-stage solution, which can be rationalized
by P1 and P2 that are Pareto consistent and pat-invariant, if and only if it
satisﬁes WIIA, EXP and COV.
(ii) A solution is a degenerate two-stage solution, which can be ratio-
nalized by a complete10, asymmetric, transitive, Pareto consistent and pat-
invariant P, if and only if it satisﬁes PAR, IIA and COV.
Proof:L e tγ be a two-stage solution that satisﬁes COV, and deﬁne P1
and P2 as in the proof of theorem 2. Let τ be a positive aﬃne transformation.
Let sP1t. Suppose by contradiction that it is not the case that τ (s)P1τ (t).
Then there exists S ∈ Σ such that τ (t)=γ (S) and τ (s) ∈ S.B y C O V ,
t = γ (τ−1 (S)) (where γ (τ−1 (S)) is well-deﬁned by D4), so that (since s ∈
τ−1 (S) ∈ Σ) sP1t is contradicted. Next, let sP2t. By the deﬁnition of P2,
D5 and COV it is immediate that τ (s)P2τ (t).
The statement now follows from theorems 2 and 3. QED
T h ei n t e r e s ta n dn o v e l t yo fp a r t( i i )o ft h et h e o r e mi st h a ti ti sacomplete
characterization of PAR, COV and IIA solutions. In the literature only
partial characterizations are stated for such solutions.
10By complete we mean here that either sPt or tPs for any distinct s and t.
12The theorem yields as an easy corollary a generalization (to diﬀerent
domains) of a partial characterization theorem by Zhou [11] given by Denicoló
and Mariotti [2] and more recently by Peters and Vermeulen [7]. Deﬁne the
asymmetric, α-weighted Nash multi-solution,b y
ν








for all S ∈ Σ, for some vector of non-negative weights α =( α1,...,αn) ∈ Rn
+.
Corollary 6 A solution that satisﬁes IIA, PAR and COV is a selection from
some asymmetric Nash multisolution.
Proof: It follows from theorems 3.3.3. in d’Aspremont [1], reformulated
transforming the variables in logs as in Moulin [5], that for any relation P
on Rn
++ that is complete, transitive, Pareto consistent and pat-invariant the
following holds: If
P
i αi logsi >
P
i αi logti,t h e nsPt.Q E D
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